Health insurance as a productive factor by Dizioli, Allan & Pinheiro, Roberto B.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Health insurance as a productive factor
Allan Dizioli and Roberto B. Pinheiro
University of Pennsylvania, University of Colorado
29 June 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39743/
MPRA Paper No. 39743, posted 30 June 2012 22:06 UTC
Health Insurance as a Productive Factor
Allan Dizioli and Roberto Pinheiroy
June 2012
Abstract
In this paper, we present a less-explored channel through which
health insurance impacts productivity: by o¤ering health insurance,
employers reduce the expected time workers spend out of work in sick
days. Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS),
we show that a worker with health coverage misses on average 52%
fewer workdays than uninsured workers, after controlling for endogene-
ity. We develop a model that embodies this impact of health coverage
in productivity. In our model, health insurance reduces the probabil-
ity that a healthy worker gets sick, missing workdays, and it increases
the probability that a sick worker recovers and returns to work. In
our model, rms that o¤er health insurance are larger and pay higher
wages in equilibrium, a pattern observed in the data. We calibrated
the model using US data for 2004 and show the impact of increases in
health costs, as well as of changes in tax benets of health insurance
expenses, on labor force health coverage and productivity. Finally, we
show that a government mandate that forces rms to o¤er health insur-
ance increases average wages and aggregate productivity while reducing
aggregate prots, ultimately having a positive impact on welfare.
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Markets.
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1 Introduction
At the core of the US health system is the role of employers as the main source
of insurance for the population at work age (18 to 64 years old). This role gen-
erates a peculiar interaction between health care and labor markets. Because
health insurance costs outside the workplace are prohibitive to most workers,
employers can distinguish themselves by o¤ering health coverage to their em-
ployees and obtain a hiring edge over rms that do not o¤er insurance. On the
other hand, as health costs have increased, the labor forces health coverage
has become a primary source of variable costs for employers. The increase in
health care costs during the last decade was followed by a reduction in the
fraction of workers covered by their employers. Consequently, the number of
uninsured rose from 36:5 million in 1994 to 45:7 million in 2008, the latter
gure representing 17:4% of the non-elderly population. The interaction be-
tween the labor market and health insurance in a scenario of rising health
care costs is also harmful to labor productivity, since a number of employers
hire workers as part-time or contract employees in order to reduce health in-
surance expenses. Similarly, many workers decide not to move to a job that
seems a better match in terms of total productivity but does not o¤er health
insurance. Therefore, a better understanding of the impact of employer-based
health insurance on labor market outcomes seems fundamental to estimating
the real cost of the US health insurance system.
In this paper, we present a second channel through which health insur-
ance impacts productivity. By o¤ering health insurance, employers reduce
employeesexpected time out of work in two ways: by reducing the probabil-
ity a worker gets sick (preventive medicine) and/or increasing the probability
a worker recovers from illness (curative medicine). Our empirical results us-
ing data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) show that a
insured worker misses on average 52% fewer workdays per year than an unin-
sured worker1, resulting in 2 to 3 more workdays in a year. This reduction in
missed workdays implies not only that any given worker becomes a more valu-
able asset for the rm, but also that fewer sick days reduce the rms expenses
in paid leaves for ill absent workers.
We develop an on-the-job search model that embodies this impact of health
coverage in productivity through fewer absences. In our model, employers
decide not only which wages to o¤er, but also wether to o¤er a health care
option to their employees. O¤ering health insurance has an impact on the
probability that a worker gets sick, misses workdays, recovers, and returns to
1As usual, we controlled for observables and endogeneity.
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work. Through this framework, we match several features empirically observed
in the connection between labor market and health insurance coverage. For
example, in our model, companies that o¤er health insurance will be larger
in equilibrium as well as o¤er a higher wage. The reason for higher wages is
derived from the productivity boost of health insurance; once employees are
working more in expected terms, losing a worker becomes more costly for a
rm. In order to avoid workers accepting outside o¤ers, rms o¤ering health
insurance pay higher wages. This positive relation between health coverage
and wages is also corroborated by our empirical ndings with the MEPS.
More specically, according to our empirical results, increases in rm size
and wage earned are positively related to the probability of a worker having
health insurance coverage. Surprisingly, these labor-related variables are more
important predictors of health coverage than health characteristics, such as
health habits or addictions.
Once we calibrate the model using US data for 2004, we evaluate the impact
of a series of policy changes in the health insurance sector on labor market
outcomes. We nd that a reduction in health insurance tax subsidies from
35% - as estimated by Gruber (2010) - to 20% generates a reduction in the
share of rms providing health insurance from 60% to 47%. Once fewer rms
o¤er insurance, the share of covered workers drops by almost 10%, while the
fraction of sick workers goes up by 12:88%. We also show that a 10% increase
in health insurance premiums reduces the proportion of workers with health
coverage by 4:35%, increasing the number of workers sick in steady state by
5:98%. In addition, we consider a scenario in which the government mandates
that all rms provide health insurance. We show that a mandate reduces rms
aggregate prot but increases previously uninsured workersutility, while the
total welfare e¤ect is positive. Finally, we consider the di¤erence in impact of
improvements on preventive versus curative care. We compare the case of a
governmental investment in medical research that makes preventive methods
10% more e¢ cient to the case in which such an investment is made to improve
curative methods (which also become 10% more e¢ cient). Our results show
that, although both medical advances have positive impact, choosing to invest
in preventive instead of curative care generates a slightly higher gain (0:018%)
in labor forces health coverage and consequently a reduction ( 0:16%) in the
number of sick workers in steady state. Keep in mind that in this exercise we
did not take into account potential di¤erences in costs of implementing such
advances, that may be considerable.
The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the
data, while Section 4 describes our econometric specications. Section 5
presents empirical results to motivate the models main hypothesis, which
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is the positive e¤ect of holding health insurance on worker productivity. Sec-
tion 6 describes the model while Section 7 presents comparative statistics and
policy experiments. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Many scholars have attempted to explain the predominance of employer pro-
vided health insurance in the United States. There are two current leading
explanations for this phenomenon. The rst explanation has to do with the
U.S. tax system, in which rms receive a tax benet when they provide nondis-
criminatory health insurance to their employees. Gruber and Poterba (1996)
estimated that the tax-induced reduction in the "price" of employer-provided
health insurance is about 27% on average. Woodbury and Huang (1991), Gru-
ber and Poterba (1994), and Gentry and Peress (1994) concluded that taxes
are an important factor in the provision of fringe benets, although, not sur-
prisingly, there is a wide range in the magnitude of the impact of taxes on fringe
benets. The second explanation is the cost advantage that employers gain
by reducing adverse selection and lowering administrative expenses through
pooling. Together these two factors reduce the cost of providing insurance in
large rms relative to small groups. Brown et al. (1990) and Brugemann and
Manovskii (2009) hypothesized these factors as the reasons why large rms are
much more likely to o¤er health insurance than smaller ones.
Regarding the e¤ect of health insurance provision on wages, the empiri-
cal literature is inconclusive. The conicting evidence highlights the di¢ culty
associated with isolating the impact of health insurance on labor market out-
comes. In principle, we should expect that employees pay for the cost of
employer-provided health insurance through lower wages. Similar to general
human capital, health remains in possession of the worker as he moves from one
job to another, so employers are unable to recover an investment in employees
health. Surprisingly, Monheit et al. (1985) estimated a positive relationship
between the two. However, their result does not seem to be robust since Gru-
ber (1994), Gruber and Krueger (1990), and Eberts and Stone (1985), using
di¤erent datasets and methods,2 found that most of the cost of the bene-
t is reected in lower wages. A problem with these studies, addressed by
2Gruber (1994) uses statewide variation in mandated maternity benets, Gruber and
Krueger (1990) employs industry and state variation in the cost of workers compensation
insurance, and Eberts and Stone (1985) relies on school district variation in health insurance
costs to estimate the manner in which wages are negatively a¤ected by health insurance
provision
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subsequent research, is the possible endogenous relationship between health
provision and wages. This endogeneity comes from the fact that workers may
choose to invest in health through insurance coverage and health habits, know-
ing that healthier individuals are more productive and obtain higher wages.
Several scholars attempted to handle this problem by looking for instrumental
variables to obtain a more accurate measure of the health-wage relationship.
Leibowitz (1983) used health insurance expenditures as an instrumental vari-
able; she used the RAND Health Insurance Study (RHIS) to estimate the
wage/fringe benet trade-o¤. The RHIS3 is considered an "ideal" database to
test this trade-o¤, as it is an individual-level database that includes human
capital variables that may be used as controls for ability as well as information
about individual health insurance expenses4. Using this "ideal" dataset, Lei-
bowitz estimated that employer health insurance expenditures had a positive
e¤ect on wages.
In spite of the vast empirical literature on this subject, few theoretical mod-
els explain the empirical ndings. In the last few years some papers attempted
to address this literature gap. Brugemann and Manovskii (2009) developed a
quantitative equilibriummodel that uses tax-deductibility of employer-provided
coverage, non-discriminatory restrictions, and the xed cost of coverage to un-
derstand labor market ows and explain why smaller rms are less likely to
provide coverage than large rms. Dey and Flinn (2005) presented an equi-
librium model of health insurance provision and wage determination by rms.
They investigated the e¤ect of employer-provided health insurance on job mo-
bility rates and economic welfare using an on-the-job search model with Nash-
bargaining. They found an equilibrium in which not all employment matches
are covered by health insurance and wages at jobs providing health insurance
are larger (in a stochastic sense) than those at jobs without health insurance.
Moreover, for any given wage rate, workers at jobs with health insurance are
less likely to leave those jobs. They also found that the employer-provided
health insurance system does not lead to any serious ine¢ ciency in mobility
decisions. Finally, Fang and Gavazza (2011) developed a frictional labor mar-
ket model in which they show that an employment-based health system fails
to internalize the entire surplus generated by health investment, which leads
to dynamic ine¢ ciencies.
Our paper is di¤erent from the previous papers in several ways. Unlike
Brugemann and Manovskii (2009), we develop a model of homogeneous rms,
3This database is also known as the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE).
4RAND contacted employers to obtain information on employer health insurance expen-
ditures before survey respondents were enrolled in the study.
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generating di¤erences in productivity endogenously through rmshealth in-
surance provision decisions. Therefore, our result remains valid even if rms
do not have di¤erent costs of providing coverage. Our model also delivers
the results without the presence of adverse selection, which is fundamental
for Brugermann and Manovskiis model even though they found no empirical
evidence to support it. Our model di¤ers from Dey and Flinns in two ways.
First, we do not assume that rms that do not o¤er health coverage necessarily
have a larger exogenous job destruction rate. Therefore, our model takes into
account not only the productivity impact of large negative health shocks but
also the impact of milder ones, which do not necessarily induce job destruc-
tion5. This approach not only is more general, but also allows us to evaluate
the impact of changes or advances in medical treatment - more specically,
investments in curative versus preventive medicine on productivity, as well as
the impact of the provision of health insurance on absenteeism and rmscosts
in paid leaves. Second, unlike Dey and Flinn, we take into account the impact
of taxes on health insurance provision, so we are able to measure the impact
of changes in the tax treatment of health insurance expenses on labor market
variables.
3 Data and Summary Statistic
The data used for this paper come from the Household Component of the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The MEPS-HC is a nationally
representative survey of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population. The
MEPS-HC collects data from a sample of households through an overlapping
panel design. Every year a new sample of households is selected to compose
a new panel. Five rounds of interviews take place over a two and a half year
period to collect the panel data. The purpose of this design is to provide
continuous and current estimates of health care expenditures at both the in-
dividual and household level for two panels for each calendar year.
The data used in this paper were collected from 2000 to 2007, i.e., we are
using information from Panel 5 to Panel 10. A total of 117,994 individuals were
interviewed about demographic characteristics, health conditions, health sta-
tus, access to care, satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income,
and employment.6 Our main focus here is estimating the impact of health
5In their model, even though diseases imply job destruction, they do not impact workers
future productivity and/or employability. These assumptions seem contradictory, once job
destructing diseases or injuries are usually related to chronic or permanent states.
6The MEPS sampling frame reects an oversample of minority groups such as blacks,
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insurance on missing workdays for people receving coverage through employ-
ment. Therefore, we only consider employed males ages 18 to 64 who do not
receive health insurance through other sources than their employers. After we
adjust the sample to t these requirements, 26,731 data points remain.
We use two di¤erent variables measuring missing workdays: (a) missing
workdays due to illness (DDNWRK) and (b) workdays missed staying in bed
(WKINBD), which imply a more serious condition7. Since results were similar,
we focused on missed workdays due to illness, because there are fewer missing
observations for this variable. Mean and standard deviation of this variable
are presented in Table 1. Summary statistics for explanatory variables are also
presented in Table 1. Health measures include Physical Component Summary
(PCS) scores, as well as some objecive measures of health, such as dummies
for smoke habits (ADSMOK) and obesity. The PCS score, a self-reported
measure of overall health regularly used in health economics, is formed from
the answers to the Short-Form 12 questions. We also include a measure of
whether the individual currently holds health insurance8 (INS). Demographic
variables include age (AGE), race (WHITE), ethnicity (HISPANICX), marital
status (MARRIED), family size (FAMSY) and years of education (EDUCYR).
Economic variables include whether or not the individual is part of an union
(UNION), real wage at 2000 Dollars (WAGEP), whether paid leave is o¤ered
to the individual (SICPAY), the employers sector of activity (PRIMARY,
SECONDARY and TERCIARY), and rm size (NUMEMP). Finally, in order
to account for the endogeneity problem of health insurance, we use dummies
for region (SOUTH, MIDWEST, WEST) as instrument variables for the prob-
ability of holding health insurance coverage. Details about the instrumental
variables will be discussed in the next section9.
Asians and Hispanics. MEPS also oversamples additional policy relevant sub-groups such
as low income households.
7According to the MEPS questionnaire, WKINBD is obtained through the following
question - "NUMBER OF DAYS MISSED WORK: {NUMBER OF DAYS}. Of those days,
how many did (PERSON) stay in bed for a half day or more?". According to MEPS, they
ask respondents to "include any time when this occurred because of (PERSON)s physical
illness or injury, or a mental or emotional problem such as stress or depression".
8MEPS includes two measures of health insurance coverage: INS and HELD. We will
discuss in the paper results with INS. Similar results were obtained with HELD and are
available upon request.
9We also used as instruments variables derived from questions about how the individual
values health insurance, if they believed they did not need Health Insurance (ADINSA), if
they thought that health insurance was not worth cost (ADINSB), and if they believed that
they could overcome ills without medical help (ADOVER). Since results were qualitatively
similar they were ommitted.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
I. Health Variables
Mean SD
Covered by Health Ins. (%) 67:52 4683
Health (pcs-12 short) 52:16 7:99
Obese (%) 42:88 4949
Smoke (%) 26:40 4408
Workdays Missed 1:752 7:50
II. Demographic Variables
Mean SD
Age (years) 39:65 10:78
Married (%) 62:45 4703
Family Size 3:292 1:695
Hispanic (%) 26:76 4427
Black (%) 10:72 3093
III. Labor Variables
Mean SD
Real wage ($ per month) 54807 4073
Paid Sick Leave (%) 59:65 4822
Unionized (%) 14:30 3468
Years of Education 12:65 3:229
IV. Regional Variables
Mean
South (%) 37:90
Northeast (%) 14:49
Midwest (%) 20:50
West (%) 27:11
Smoke is a dummy that assumes value 1 if the individual is a regular smoker
Obese is a dummy that assumes value 1 if individuals body mass index (BMI) is larger than 30.
Source: MEPS - Authorscalculations
4 Econometric Specication
This section tests the crucial hypothesis implicitly assumed throughout our pa-
per, which is: If a worker holds health coverage, then he will on average miss
fewer workdays due to illness than an uninsured worker with similar charac-
teristics. The decision to miss a workday can be treated within the random
utility framework used in binary choice models. U0i denotes the utility of not
missing a workday while sick, while U1i is the utility of missing a workday. Let
U0 = x
0
i0 + "0i and U1 = x
0
i1 + "1i where xi is a vector of covariates im-
portant to explain the number of missed workdays and "ij are random errors.
Thus, If an individual misses a workday, we know that:
U1i > U0i ! 10 < x0i(1   0);
where 10 = Pr["0i   "1i]: Therefore, the decision to miss a workday can
be represented by a Binomial Model. This is the model which motivates the
Poisson econometric specication used in this section. Formally, let X be the
number of successes in a large number of N independent Bernoulli trials with
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success probability 10 of each trial being small. Then it is a well-known result
that as N ! 1 and 10 ! 0, and N10 =  > 0, this Binomial distribution
function converges to a Poisson distribution function with parameter : The
above assertion is an application of a well-known argument used to justify the
framework of count data models for the study of medical care utilization based
on event counts. Here a missed workday is treated in the same way as a doctor
consultation. This model can be generalized in a straightforward manner to
allow for unobserved heterogeneity which will imply an overdispersed count
model like the negative binomial. We provide empirical evidence suggesting
overdispersion of the number of missed workdays due to illness, and for this
reason this article also analyzes the negative binomial specication.
Negative Binomial Specication
Let yi denote the number of workdays missed due to illness, which is ob-
viously a count variable that takes non-negative integer values. The density
function for the negative binomial (NB) model is given by:
Pr[Y = mij ; ) =  (mi + i)
 (i) (mi + 1)

i
i + i
i  i
i + i
yi
; (1)
where
i = exp(x
0
i)
and the precision parameter is given by:
i = (1=)
where  is an overdispersion parameter. As a result of this specication,
we have:
E(yijxi) = i
and
V (yijxi) = i(1 + )
This model is called the negative binomial-1 (NB1) model.
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4.1 Estimation Procedure
In order to evaluate the impact of health coverage on workdays missed,
we must account for the possible endogeneity of health insurance provision,
since health insurance may be o¤ered only to healthy people, who naturally
miss fewer workdays. To deal with this problem, we follow the two-stage
residual inclusion approach (2SRI) suggested by Terza et. al. (2008), which
is a version of the control function approach (see details at Navarro (2008)).
Our exposition here follows Cameron and Trivedi (2009).
Let mi denote the number of workdays missed. We are assuming that
mi follows a NB1 distribution. We know that:
i = E(mijhi; xi; ui) = exp(1hi + x01i2 + ui) (2)
Assume that the error term ui is correlated with the dummy variable
hi, which is equal to 1 when a worker holds health insurance and 0 otherwise.
We also assume that the error term ui is uncorrelated with xi;which is a vector
of exogenous regressors.
In order to solve this endogeneity problem, we need to nd instruments
for the health insurance variable hi: Hence, we specify a probit equation for
the dummy variable hi :
hi = (x
0
2i) + "i (3)
where x2i is a vector which may include variables which a¤ect workdays
missed, but x2i also contains variables which a¤ect the probability of holding
health insurance while only a¤ecting workdays missed through hi: Similarly to
the linear case, a condition for a robust identication of 2 is that there is at
least one valid excluded variable (instrument).
We also assume that there is a common latent factor " which a¤ects
both hi and mi and is the only source of dependence between them, after
controlling for the inuence of the observable variables x1 and x2: We can
model this assumption as follows:
ui = "i + vi
where vi is independent of "i, vi is i.i.d., and E [evi ] = constant.
Using this additional assumption, it is possible to show that:
i = E(mijhi; xi; "i) = exp(1hi + x01i2 + "i) (4)
If "i were observable, we could just include it as an additional regressor
and this would solve the endogeneity problem. Since we cannot observe it, we
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replace it with a consistent estimate. Therefore, the rst step of our estimation
is to estimate 3 and obtain the residuals e^i. Then we estimate the parameters
of the negative binomial given in 4 by replacing "i by e^i:
5 Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of our estimation procedure using di¤erent
models and explanatory variables. To check the consistency of our estimation,
we not only estimate the Negative Binomial model but also estimate a Poisson
model with a robust standard error estimate10. In Table 2, we use an OLS
estimator for health insurance in the rst step of our procedure. In Table 3,
we use a Probit model in the rst step, as described above. We use regional
dummies as instrumental variables for health insurance. The reason for us-
ing regional variables as instruments is that there is a signicant di¤erence in
health insurance coverage across regions in the US. However, we should not
expect that the regional variables would have any impact on the number of
workdays a worker misses. In fact, we run a regression using regional vari-
ables as explanatory variables in the second step regression and we nd that
the regional dummies are uncorrelated with missed workdays, conrming the
validity of these dummies as instruments for health insurance coverage.
Before we start discussing the empirical results, it is important to no-
tice that the coe¢ cient assigned for residuals is always signicant11, indicating
that our data is characterized by endogeneity. The positive coe¢ cient for the
residuals indicate that latent factors that increase the probability that an indi-
vidual will have health coverage also increase the number of missed workdays
- an e¤ect consistent with adverse selection. The data also show signs of
overdispersion, since the parameter alpha at the negative binomial estimation
is always positive and statistically di¤erent from zero.
As for the rst step regression, we nd that the coe¢ cients have the
expected sign for explaining health insurance coverage. Workerscharacteristic
variables indicate that the probability of being covered increases with age,
wage, education, family size, and union membership. Being a member of a
racial or ethnic minority decreases the probability that a worker is covered.
In terms of our regional instrument variables, the Northeast region is the one
omitted from our regressions. Thus, we nd that people living in the South
and West regions have a lower probability of having health coverage when
10We use the bootstrap method to control for the rst stage estimation of bei, as well as
overdispersion.
11Following a robust Wald test based on its z-statistic
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compared to the Northeast region, while Midwesterners are as likely to be
insured as Northeasterners. Finally, health variables have an ambiguous sign.
While the self-reported overall health measure (HEALTH) is not statistically
signicant, being a smoker reduces the probability of having health insurance.
We obtain similar qualitatively results for the probit rst step in Table 3.
The main paper hypothesis is tested in the second step regression.
Thus, we are interested in the Health Insurance coe¢ cient, which describes
the inuence of holding a health insurance plan on the number of workdays an
employee misses. Given our specication, if the Health Insurance coe¢ cient is
negative, then a worker who holds health insurance misses fewer workdays. In
all specications shown below, we nd a negative and statistically signicant
coe¢ cient for Heath Insurance at 10%; and at 5% for all but the Negative
Binomial regression with a linear regression in the rst step. The impact of
health insurance on workdays missed is also quantitatively substantial, repre-
senting a reduction of between 52:1% and 90:3% in the expected number of
workdays missed. Thus, our empirical results support our papers hypothesis,
and workers who hold health insurance are less often absent and consequently
more productive.
The other explanatory variablescoe¢ cients have the expected sign
or are not statistically signicant in the second step count regression. For
brevitys sake, we will discuss just a few of them here. The self-reported
health status have negative and signicant coe¢ cients in all specications,
indicating that a healthier worker misses fewer workdays. Since we control for
these health indexes, the dummies indicating if the worker is obese or smoker
are not signicant for most of our model specications. Being a member
of a union or working for a large company increases the number of workdays
missed, the last result corroborating previous research by Barmby and Stephen
(2000). Demographic variables such as age and family size have no impact on
the number of workdays missed12. The Paid Leave coe¢ cient is positive in
some specications, an expected sign since paid sick leaves reduce the cost of
missing a workday, a result also observed in previous research on absenteeism.
We also include other controls, such as dummy variables indicating di¤erent
economic activity sectors. We nd no signicant impact of secondary sector
on workdays missed. However, coe¢ cients for the primary sectors dummy are
positive in all specications in which they are statistically signicant. In order
to save space in the tables, the results on activity sectors have been omitted
12MEPS also asks if a worker misses a workday because he or she needs to take care of
a sick relative. Therefore, it is not surprising that family size has no signicant impact on
the workers own sick days.
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but are available upon request.
6 Model
There is a continuum of risk neutral workers (measurem). While unemployed,
the worker receives a job o¤er with probability 0:When employed, the worker
receives a job o¤er with probability 1: Once received, the o¤er can be accepted
or rejected. There is no recall. While unemployed, the worker receives b
(unemployment insurance or the utility of leisure) each period. All agents
discount future income at rate r.
We assume risk-neutral rms with measure normalized to 1. Firms
o¤er a contract that is comprised of health insurance coverage and an hourly
wage. In order to simplify the notation, we use the subscript L for rms that
o¤er health insurance (Low health risk) and the subscript H for rms that
do not o¤er health insurance (High health risk). To o¤er health coverage, the
rm has to pay an up-front cost C: Since the costs of insurance are shared by
rm and worker, we allow an employee to decide if he wants coverage or not
once it is o¤ered. If yes, he has to pay a ow cost of ce per period. Otherwise,
nothing is paid. We do not assume that health is part of the workers utility
function, but health insurance a¤ects the probability that a worker gets sick
() (preventive medicine) and/or the expected time he stays sick (1

): For
instance, a worker who has health insurance has a lower probability of getting
sick (L) than a worker without coverage (H), that is, H  L; as well as a
higher probability of healing (L  H) :
The proportion of rms not o¤ering health insurance is H , while the
proportion of rms o¤ering it is L; these proportions being pinned down in
equilibrium. We assume that the (potentially trivial) distribution of wages
o¤ered by rms providing health insurance is given by FL (z), while the dis-
tribution of wages o¤ered by rms which do not provide it is FH (z).
A sick worker receives only a  2 (0; 1) fraction of his wage. This as-
sumption follows from the most recent available data from the Bureau of Labor
StatisticsNational Compensation Survey (NCS) (covering March 2008), which
shows that 39 percent of private-sector workers in the United States have no
paid sick days or leave. Whenever paid leaves are available, they cover around
60% of the regular salary a worker receives. Since this value is not taxed, the
amount can represent up to 80% of the regular wage. Similarly, a sick employee
has a potentially higher job destruction rate (S) than a healthy employee () ;
S  : Finally, we assume that sick workers incur additional medical costs :
Since health insurance covers most costs to its members, we have L  H : A
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diagram describing the workers problem is depicted in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1
In the next subsection, we will look at the workersoptimal decision.
Subsequently, we will look at the rms optimization problem, and how rms
choice on health insurance coverage and wages will depend on workersand
competitorsbehavior. Finally, we will discuss the steady state equilibrium.
All proofs and further calculations are in the appendix.
6.1 Workers Problem
From the framework outlined above, the expected discounted lifetime income
when a worker is unemployed and healthy, V0; can be expressed as the solution
of the following equation:
rV0 = b+ 0
X
i=H;L
i
Z
max fVi (z)  V0; 0g dFi (z) + H (D0   V0)
14
where b can be seen as unemployment insurance as well as utility of leisure.
A job o¤er arrives with a probability 0. A fraction H of o¤ers comes from
rms that do not o¤er health insurance while the remainder comes from rms
o¤ering health coverage. Wages o¤ered are seen by workers as draws from
equilibrium distributions Fi (z), where i 2 fH;Lg 13: D0 is the value of being
an unemployed sick worker. We assume that unemployed workers dont have
health insurance and that the only way a worker can obtain health insurance
is through his employer. This is a simplifying assumption based on the very
low percentage of the working population that has private insurance.14 It is
also without loss of generality in our model, since, as we will see, rms o¤ering
wages that would lead workers to buy insurance would optimally o¤er health
insurance. Notice that D0 is given by:
rD0 = b  H + H (V0  D0)
where H is an additional cost of being sick without health coverage, while
H is the probability a sick worker without coverage recovers. Rearranging the
above expression and substituting it back, we have:
rV0 = b+ 0
" X
i=H;L
i
Z 1
RiU
(Vi (z)  V0) dFi (z)
#
+ H

b  H   rV0
r + H

where RLU and R
H
U are the unemployeds reservation wage for working in a
health-coverage company and no health-coverage company15 .
Once a worker is employed at a rm that does not o¤er health insurance,
the value of holding a job with wage w at this company is:
rVH (w) =
(
w + 1
P
i=H;L i
R
RiH(w)
(Vi (z)  VH (w)) dFi (z)
+ (V0   VH (w)) + H (DH (w)  VH (w))
)
where 1 is the probability a job o¤er arrives. As before, a fraction H of
o¤ers comes from rms that dont o¤er health insurance while the remainder
13Using the same approach as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we initially assume that
the distributions of wages, Fi(z); i 2 fH;Lg are given and we focus on the optimal workers
decisions given these distributions. We also assume the distributions are well-behaved:
continuous, and di¤erentiable (e.g. no mass points). Later, we will derive these distributions
and it will be trivial to show that the assumed properties hold.
14Most buyers of private health insurance are entrepreneurs/self-employed, a choice that
is not allowed in our model.
15The fact that the optimal policy is a reservation policy is straightforward and standard.
If one accepts wage w1 as part of an optimal policy, then any wage w2 > w1 for rms that
are otherwise identical, gives more utility and hence should be accepted as well.
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comes from rms o¤ering health coverage. O¤ers above the reservation wage
RiH (w) 2 fH;Lg are accepted. As expected, reservation wages can di¤er
depending on the company o¤ering health coverage or not. A job match
between a rm and a healthy worker is destroyed with probability . Finally,
a worker without health insurance gets sick with probability H and DH (w)
is the value of being sick while holding a job that pays a wage rate of w at a
company that does not o¤er health coverage. Therefore:
rDH (w) = w   H + H (VH (w) DH (w)) + S (D0  DH (w))
where  is the reduction in wages given by the sick leave. We will assume from
here on that   r+S
r++1
. As mentioned before, a worker without health insur-
ance heals with probability H and a job match is destroyed with probability
S   if the worker is sick.
In the case in which a rm o¤ers health coverage, we need to take into
account the workers decision of accepting the coverage or not. Therefore, the
value of holding a job at wage w in a company that o¤ers health coverage is:
VL (w) = max fVL (w; y) ; VL (w; n)g
where y and n indicate whether or not the worker accepted the coverage,
respectively. But notice that VL (w; n) = VH (w). Therefore:
rVL (w) = max fVL (w; y) ;VH (w)g
where:
rVL (w; y) =
(
w   ce + 1
P
i=H;L i
R
RiL(w)
(Vi (z)  VL (w; y)) dFi (z)
+ (V0   VL (w; y)) + L (DL (w)  VL (w; y))
)
As mentioned before, in this case the worker pays a ow cost of ce. We
assume that this cost is paid even when the worker is sick, which implies that
the value of being a sick worker at this company is given by:
rDL (w) = w   ce   L + L (VL (w; y) DL (w)) + S (D0  DL (w))
Notice that a rm would only pay the cost C if the worker opted to buy
insurance, while a worker would only buy the o¤ered health coverage if at
the o¤ered wage w4; VL
 
w4; y
  VH  w4. In Appendix A we show that
a worker would buy the coverage o¤ered if the wage received w4 were larger
than a threshold ew, determined implicitly by:
16

1 +
L
r + S + L

ce =
( 
L
r+S+L
  Hr+S+H

[e!   (r + S)VH (e!) + SD0]
+ Hr+S+H
H   Lr+S+LL
)
Finding reservation wages: In principle, we could consider four
types of job-to-job transitions (two kinds of transition between companies of
di¤erent types, two kinds between companies of the same type.). However, it
is trivial that the reservation wage for transitions between jobs at rms with
the same health coverage is simply the present wage, i.e.
Rii(wi) = wi:
When we consider the transition between di¤erent types of rms, the fol-
lowing simple result simplies the problem. Keep in mind that RLH(y) is the
minimum wage that a health-coverage rm needs to o¤er to poach a worker
employed at a no-health-coverage rm currently earning y. Similarly, RHL (x)
is the minimum wage that a no-health-coverage rm needs to o¤er to poach
an insured worker currently receiving wage x:
Lemma 1 Given that Vi(w) is continuous and strictly increasing in w for
both i = L;H, for a wage x at a health-coverage rm, and a wage y at
a no-health-coverage rm, the following should hold
RLH(y) = x () RHL (x) = y:16
Hence, we can nd a function ! () that maps wages at health-coverage
rms into wages at no-health-coverage rms, such that for y = !(x);
RHL (x) = !
(x); and RLH(y) = !
 1(y)
The function ! is continuous and strictly increasing.
In Appendix B, we show that ! (w) > w, i.e. that the function ! ()
is above the 45 degree line, as well as that d!
(w)
dw
> 1, for every wage above the
threshold ew: These properties not only imply that all wages can be rescaled
into health-coverage rm equivalentwages without loss of generality,17 but
they also show that workers will ask for a wage premium to work in a company
that does not o¤er health coverage (! (w) > w) and this premium is increasing
with the current wage level (d!
(w)
dw
> 1).
16A particular case of the result above is RLH
 
RLU

= RHU
17Of course, we alternatively could rescale all solid wages into risky rm equivalents.
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Since by denition wH and wL = ! 1(wH) have the same utility
values, we can also replace VH(wH) with VL(! 1(wH)) in the integrals of the
value function, and integrate over the cumulative distribution of low-risk-rm-
equivalent wages in the economy, F (z) (notice the absence of the subscript!),
which we dene as follows:
F (z) = LFL (z) + (1  L)FH (! (z))
Once we make this adjustment, the only thing that matters for the workers
decision is the wage level in terms of health-coverage-rm-equivalentunits.
6.2 Firms Problem
In this subsection, we take the behavior of workers as given and derive the
rmsoptimal response. Firms post wages that maximize their prots taking as
given the distribution of wages posted by their competitors (Fi(w); i 2 fH;Lg)
and the distribution of wages healthy employed workers are currently earning
at other rms, given by distributions Gi(w); i 2 fH;Lg. We will assume here
that all distributions are stationary and well-behaved. In addition, rms decide
about the provision of health insurance. If a rm o¤ers health insurance, then
it has to pay an up-front cost of C: Note that rms have to pay taxes t on
wages, but they do not pay taxes on health insurance coverage expenditures
C.
As we saw previously, a workers decision depends only on whether an
o¤er is higher in health-coverage-rm-equivalent wages. Therefore, we can
construct a cumulative distribution of employed workersequivalent-wages as
follows:
G (w) = (1  vH)GL (w) + vHGH (!(w))
where vH is the proportion of healthy employed workers in no health-coverage
companies.
When a rm is choosing the optimal wage level, it has to take in
consideration the amount of active workers it can attract at any given wage.
For this reason, before we analyze the rms wage decision, lets derive the
rms labor force. Since derivations are the same for rms o¤ering and not
o¤ering coverage, consider a rm of type i 2 fH;Lg : Then the net inow of
workers over time, given an equivalent-wage posted w is:
dli (w)
dt
= 0u+1G (w) (m  u  se   su)+idi (w) [ + i + 1 (1  F (w))] li (w)
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where di (w) is the amount of sick workers the rm keeps in any given period,
while u, se, su is the measure of healthy unemployed workers, sick employed
workers and sick unemployed workers in the economy, respectively. Therefore,
every period a rm receives an inow of unemployed workers at rate 0; an
inow of currently employed workers at rate 1G (w), and an inow coming
from previously sick employees at rate i. Similarly, every period it loses
workers at rate  to unemployment, at rate 1 (1  F (w)) to other rms, and
at rate i to sickness. Since in steady state we have
dli(w)
dt
= 0, we have, after
substituting di (w):
li (w) =
0u+ 1G (w) (m  u  se   su)
 + 1 (1  F (w)) + Si+S i
Note that the steady state amounts of workers are di¤erent, even when
equivalent wages are o¤ered, because of di¤erent outows into sickness. Since
H  L and L  H , with at least one inequality strict, lL > lH at any
health-coverage-rm-equivalentwage. In terms of the total amount of sick
workers kept, the result is ambiguous, although we know that companies that
o¤er health coverage keep a smaller fraction of their labor force in sick leave
at any period in time. As is standard in on-the-job search models, we focus
on the maximization of steady state prots.18
Profit Maximization Every wage in distributions FL; FH must be
optimal in equilibrium; this necessarily means that all wages o¤ered by rms
of the same type must yield the same prot. Thus, for a health coverage rms
maximization, the following must be true in equilibrium
ProtL = maxw
(p  w(1 + t)) lL (w)  w(1 + t)dL (w)  C
given F (w); G(w);
FL(w)  fw0jw0 2 argmax (p  w(1 + t)) lL (w)  (1 + t)wdL (w)  Cg:
And, for a rm that does not o¤er health coverage:
ProtH = maxw
(p  ! (w) (1 + t)) lH (w)  (1 + t)! (w) dH (w)
given F (w); G(w);
FH(!
(w))  f!(w0)jw0 = argmax (p  (1 + t)! (w)) lH (w) (1+t)! (w) dH (w)g:
18See Coles (2001) for a discussion of this focus.
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However, we do not know yet what the distributions F (w); FL(wL); and
FH(wH) look like. All we know at this stage is that in the equilibrium, every
equivalent-wage in the support of F (w)must be o¤ered by a rm either o¤ering
or not o¤ering health coverage.
To construct the distributions of wages o¤ered in equilibrium, we will need
to show some additional properties of wages posted by rms that o¤er and do
not o¤er health coverage. Theorem 1 will allow us not only to put additional
structure on the support of wages o¤ered by each rm type, but also to say
that in this environment rms do not pay compensating di¤erentials for higher
health risks.
But before that, let us present formally the result previously mentioned
that no rm that o¤er health-coverage will o¤er a wage below ew:
Lemma 2 Any rm that pays the up-front cost C will o¤er a wage that
induces workers to join the health insurance plan.
Now we are ready to present the result that allow us to pin down the wage
distributions:
Theorem 1 Suppose that wL and wH are prot-maximizing equivalent-wages
o¤ered in equilibrium by a rm providing health insurance and by a rm
not providing insurance, respectively. For these wages it holds that
wL 2 argmax
w
f(p  w(1 + t)) lL (w)  w(1 + t)dL (w)  Cg;
wh 2 argmax
w
f(p  ! (w) (1 + t)) lH (w)   (1 + t)! (w) dH (w)g
Then, we must have wL  wH : Moreover, the sets of equivalent-wages
o¤ered by health-coverage rms, and likewise by no-health-coverage rms,
are connected sets.
This proposition shows that the compensating wage di¤erentials demanded
by the worker for an increase in health risk are not suppliedby the other
side of the market. In the labor market equilibrium, rms that decide not
to provide health insurance cannot protably compete in wages with rms
providing it, especially when the required compensating di¤erential becomes
large. The reason for this is that paying a high wage for a worker who will
be uninsured is not prot maximizing, since the worker will be less productive
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due to sick leaves, while still receiving a fraction  of that high wage while sick.
As a result, rms that do not o¤er insurance prefer to make more prot per
worker and to keep this worker for a shorter period than to pay higher wage
rates and risk keeping an unproductive worker for a long period of time due
to sickness. Firms o¤ering health insurance, on the other hand, pay higher
wages to attract and keep the workers for a longer period since they have
already invested in health insurance to keep them healthy and therefore more
productive.19 The di¤erences in average size among rms o¤ering and not
o¤ering health coverage are also an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
As rms with health coverage o¤er more attractive wages than rms with no
coverage, they have a higher expected inow of workers and a lower expected
outow, leading to a higher steady state labor force.
An important last remark is that since all rms are identical at the
beginning of each period, they all must have the same prot, otherwise either
all rms will invest in health insurance or no rm will invest in it. Therefore,
the fraction of rms not investing in health insurance (H) is endogenously
determined by the following equal prot condition. For any wages wL and
wH o¤ered in equilibrium by rms o¤ering and not o¤ering health coverage,
respectively, we have:
ProtL =

p 

1 +
L
L + S

wL(1 + t)

lL (wL)  C =
=

p 

1 +
H
H + S

wH(1 + t)

lH (wH) = ProtH
Clearly, depending on the parameters, we may have three possible out-
comes:
1.) All rms o¤er health insurance;
2.) No rm o¤ers health insurance;
3.) A fraction (1  H) 2 (0; 1) o¤ers health insurance.
As expected, in the next section, our discussion will focus in the third case.
We are now ready to dene the steady state equilibrium formally:
Denition 1 A steady state equilibrium in the labor market is a tuple fRHU ; !(),
FL(); FH(); GL(); GH(); u; se; su; Hg, such that
19This result is similar to the one found in Fu (2011) in a di¤erent context. Fu (2011) have
proved that in an environment with search friction, rms will pay part of the investment in
General Human Capital. In the introduction we argued that we can interpret health as a
kind of General Human Capital since it is valued by employers and employees take it with
them from job to job.
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1. Given fFL; FHg, RHU ; ! follow from workers optimization
2. Given fFL; FH ; GL; GH ; u; se; su; RHU ; !g rms maximize;
3. GL; GH are stationary distributions, u is stationary unemployment for
healthy workers, se is stationary measure of sick employees, su is sta-
tionary measure of sick unemployed workers, given the optimal decisions
of workers in (1), and rms in (2);
The rst two items have been covered in the last two sections. Using
these previously presented results, we can show 3 constructing the stationary
distributions GL and GH as well as the measures of unemployed and sick
workers mentioned.
In Appendix C, we explicitly characterize these equilibrium distribu-
tions and outline the existence of a steady state equilibrium by construction.
7 Discussion and Policy Analysis
The benet of an equilibrium analysis is that it allows us to analyze the impact
of changes in policy, while taking into account the overall e¤ects and potential
externalities of such measures. In this section, we present some policy exercises
in order to evaluate the impact of changes in health costs and health treatments
(preventive vs. curative) on relevant endogenous variables, such as the measure
of rms o¤ering health coverage, the measure of workers with health coverage,
the measure of sick workers in steady state, and unemployment.
We calibrate the parameters in our model according to the data for
the American economy in 2004. The unit of time considered is 1 month. First
of all, the labor product p is obtained from the output per worker provided
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) through the Survey of Current
Business for 200420. Unemployed benets b are set to 36% of monthly average
wage, which is the national average according to the National Employment
Law Center. The measure of workers relative to the number of rms, m,
is obtained from the 2004 Census by dividing the total number of employer
rms by the number of establishments. For the labor-market arrival rates,
, we use the estimates by Jolivet et. al. (2002) based on data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1994-1997. The probabilities of
getting sick and healing,  and  respectively, are derived from our estimates
of the number of days lost using the MEPS dataset described in a previous
20We also calculated p as the GDP per employed worker for 2004, which gave us similar
qualitative results.
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section. The cost of health insurance, C, is determined according to the 2004
average premium of an individual health insurance plan reported by the Kaiser
Family Foundation. The exogenous termination rates are computed from the
MEPS data set to match the unemployment rate of the healthy workers, ,
and the unemployment rate of sick workers, S21. Finally, the disutility of
getting sick without health insurance, H , is determined by the average cost
of health services in the MEPS data set. Following Gruber (2010), we consider
here a tax price of 0:65; i.e., a dollar of health insurance costs 35 cents less
than a dollar of other goods purchased with after-tax wages22. The calibrated
parameters are presented in the table below:
Table 4: Calibration
p b H:I: cost m H L  0
4934:30 804 3695 19:96 4400 0 0:81 0:143
1 H L H L  s r tax
0:0112 0:088 0:086 3:33 12:05 0:00477 0:01 275 0:001 0:35
The model performance can be evaluated in Table 5. The model does a
reasonably good job matching the measure of rms o¤ering health insurance
and the measure of workers with health insurance. The model underestimates
the percentage of workers unemployed in equilibrium, although this is probably
related to a problem with the PSID as presented by Brown and Duncan (1996).
The model underestimates the wage for covered workers while overestimating
the wage for uninsured workers, which is understandable given the signicant
presence of heterogeneity among workers in the data. One potential issue here
is that the PSID has been criticized for having noisy and often inconsistent
measures of job turnover, which result from questions about job tenure that are
somewhat ambiguous.23 In order to overcome that criticism, we also calibrate
the model in which the labor-market arrival rates are derived from the NLSY
21We also used the estimates from Dey and Flinn (2005) for  and s with similar results.
22Therefore, we multiply rms cost of providing health insurance C and workers ow
cost ce by (1  0:35) :
23Brown and Light (1992) show that the coe¢ cients from probit estimation using PSID
turnover measures as the dependent variable are quitesensitive, both in sign and magnitude,
to how one cleans the data.
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by Bowlus et. al. (1995) with results that are qualitatively similar.
Table 5: Model vs. Actual Data
Variables Benchmark Actual data % Variation
Share of rms o¤ering HI 60% 59% 1: 69%
Unemployment 3:72% 5:41%  31:24%
Avg. wage of insured 4; 694:39 5; 342:14  12:13%
Avg. wage of uninsured 4; 381:07 3; 251:01 34:76%
STDV of insureds wage 84:92 2; 063  95:88%
STDV of uninsureds wage 108:98 4; 472  97:56%
Let us now consider the impact of rising health insurance costs on the mea-
sure of rms that o¤er coverage in equilibrium. This is initially tricky since
the cost is divided among rms and employees. According to Buchmueller
and Monheit (2009), the share of premiums paid directly by employees has re-
mained constant over the past decade at around 15 percent for single coverage
and 25 percent for family coverage. Therefore, we will assume that the worker
pays 19 percent of the cost while the company pays the rest of it. The graph
below summarizes our results:
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As we can see, an increase in health insurance costs steeply reduces
the fraction of rms o¤ering health coverage in equilibrium. Since rms o¤er-
ing health coverage tend to be larger in equilibrium, the reduction in health
coverage among workers is not as pronounced, but it is still signicant. As
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expected, the measure of sick workers in steady state goes up. The measure
of unemployed workers goes slightly up.24
Considering an increase in 10% of the health insurance premium, while
keeping the share paid by employee and rm constant, we nd the following
result, in which the rst column represents the values of the current calibration:
Table 6: E¤ect of Higher Health Insurance Premium
Benchmark Higher Premium % Variation
Share of rms o¤ering insurance 59:95% 54:08%  9: 79%
Share of workers insured 83:19% 79:57%  4: 35%
Fraction of sick workers 1:087% 1:152% 5: 98%
Unemployment rate 3:278% 3:282% 0:122%
Therefore, an increase in 10% in the price of health insurance generates a
reduction of 9:79% in the fraction of rms o¤ering coverage and a reduction of
4:35% in the measure of workers covered. This reduction in health insurance
coverage generates an increase in the measure of sick workers in steady state
by 5:98%:
Now, let us suppose that the U.S. government decides to reduce the tax
benets on health insurance expenses. Following Gruber (2010), we consider
here a tax price of 0:65; i.e., a dollar of health insurance costs 35 cents less
than a dollar of other goods purchased with after-tax wages. We then simulate
the model with a reduction of tax benets such that the tax price becomes
0:8; with results presented in Table 7. The main result is the large reduction
in the fraction of rms providing health insurance, which drops from 60% in
the benchmark model to 47% with the reduction in tax benets. Similarly, the
share of workers covered by health insurance is reduced by almost 10%. It is
not surprising that the fraction of sick workers in steady state goes up, given
the reduction in the fraction of the labor force covered. Finally, even though
average wages go up in each group - with and without health insurance - since
there is a shift of a fraction of the labor force from rms with health coverage
to rms without it, the overall average wage goes down, from $4; 641: 70 to
$4; 630: 60.
24This results are qualitatively independent from S > :
25
Table 7: Model with Lower Tax Benets vs Benchmark
Variables Benchmark Low Tax Benets1 % Variation
Share of rms o¤ering insurance 60% 47%  21:67%
Share of workers insured 83:19% 75:18%  9: 63%
Fraction of sick workers 1:087% 1:227% 12:88%
Unemployment 3:72% 3:74% 0:54%
Average wage of insured 4; 694:39 4; 700:15 0:12%
Avg. wage of uninsured 4; 381:07 4; 419:75 0:88%
1Tax Benets reduced from 35 to 20%
Using our calibrated model, we can also analyze the e¤ects of a policy
change in which the U.S. government mandates that all rms provide health
insurance. The main outcomes predicted by the model in this hypothetical sit-
uation are described in Table 8 below. As a result of this new policy, rms are
worse o¤, as aggregate prots are reduced, even though the monthly aggregate
product increases as a result of more productive workers - notice the reduction
of sick workers in steady state. This result is not surprising, since the mandate
reduces rmschoices and the decision not to o¤er health insurance by some
rms was a prot-maximizing choice. The results for workers are a bit more
ambiguous. Workers that have been previously uninsured are better o¤, their
average wage goes up and their expected time sick goes down. However, work-
ers previously insured are slightly worse o¤, because their average wage goes
down. To pin down the net e¤ect, we calculate the utilitarian social welfare
function for this economy and we see that welfare goes up, showing that the
extra utility gained by new covered workers more than fully compensated by
the reduction in rmsprot or utility losses by previously insured workers.
Table 8: E¤ects of Government Mandate
Variables Benchmark Mandate % Variation
FirmsAggregate Prot 3; 721:58 2; 479:47  33: 38%
Aggregate Product 93; 785:63 94; 103:06 0:338 5%
Share of rms o¤ering HI 60% 100% 66: 67%
Share of workers insured 83:19% 100% 20: 21%
Fraction of sick workers 1:087% 0:781%  28: 15%
Avg. wage of insured 4; 694:39 4; 677:27  0:3647%
Avg. wage of uninsured 4; 381:07 4; 677:27 6: 761%
Unemployment 3:73% 3:70%  0:804%
Social Welfare 88; 440; 807:83 89; 462; 704:01 1:156%
We also wanted to explore which would be the better health insurance
coverage, one that reduces the probability that a worker gets sick (preventive
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medicine - reduction in ) or one that reduces the time that a worker stays
sick (curative medicine - reduction in ). In order to further investigate the
impact of investments in preventive versus curative medicine, we consider the
following exercise. Assume that the government has as its main goals to reduce
the number of sick workers and to increase the number of workers with health
insurance. In order to achieve such goals the government can invest a given
amount in scientic advances for preventive or curative medicine. This invest-
ment can reduce the probability a worker gets sick or increase the probability
that he or she recovers once sick by 10%. Considering that only workers with
health insurance could benet from the medical advance, which choice would
be the best? The following table compares the results of both cases to the
benchmark calibrated model:
Table 9: Preventive vs Curative Methods
Benchmark Preventive Curative
Share of rms o¤ering health insurance 59:946% 60:475% 60:449%
Share of workers covered by insurance 83% 83:511% 83:496%
Fraction of sick workers 1:087% 1:053% 1:055%
Unemployment rate 3:728% 3:725% 3:726%
As expected, even though both investments have a positive impact,
the preventive medicine has a slightly greater impact than the curative one,
even though di¤erences are small. Clearly, this is just a rst step in this topic.
Natural extensions of this exercise need to consider di¤erences in the cost of
investments, as well as di¤erences in the cost of treatments in both cases, as
well as a deeper discussion of social welfare.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we show that health coverage has a positive impact on labor
productivity by reducing the number of sick days a worker needs to take.
Our empirical results using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) show that a worker with health coverage misses on average 52% fewer
workdays per year than workers without health coverage. We introduce this
productivity edge to an on-the-job search model in which employers not only
post wages, but also decide whether or not to o¤er health coverage. In equi-
librium, rms o¤ering health coverage are bigger and o¤er higher wages on
average. These results are also corroborated by our empirical ndings with
the MEPS. According to our empirical results, increases in rm size and wage
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earned are positively related to the probability of a worker having health insur-
ance coverage. Surprisingly, these labor-related variables are more important
predictors of health coverage than health characteristics, such as health habits
or addictions.
Once we calibrate the model using US data for 2004, we evaluate the im-
pact of a series of policy changes in the health insurance sector on labor market
outcomes. We show that an increase of 10% in health insurance premiums re-
duces the proportion of workers with health coverage by 4:35%, increasing the
number of sick workers in steady state by 5: 98%. We also nd that a reduc-
tion in health insurance tax benets from 35% to 20% generates a reduction
in the share of rms providing health insurance from 60% to 47%. We also
consider a scenario in which the government mandates that all rms provide
health insurance. We show that a mandate reduces rmsaggregate prot but
increases previously uninsured workersutility, while the total welfare e¤ect
is positive. Finally, we consider the di¤erence in impact of improvements on
preventive versus curative care. We compare the case of a governmental invest-
ment in medical research that makes preventive methods 10% more e¢ cient
to the case in which such an investment is made to improve curative methods
(which also become 10% more e¢ cient). Our results show that, although both
medical advances have positive impact, choosing to invest in preventive in-
stead of curative care generates a slightly higher gain (0:018%) in labor forces
health coverage and consequently a reduction ( 0:16%) in the number of sick
workers in steady state.
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Table 2 E¤ects of health insurance on productivity (OLS)
First step regression: Linear Regression
Health South Midwest West Hispanic
Held insurance  :0005414
( 0:92)
 :033103
( 2:49)
:01064
(0:74)
 :02999
( 2:16)
 :193276
( 16:12)
Real Wage1 Firm Size2 Union Smoke Black
0:0117
(11:86)
0:3567
(15:23)
:14335
(11:74)
 :06313
( 6:20)
 :061258 
( 4:59)
Age Education Family Size White Collar
:004893
(11:63)
:022993
(12:85)
:00809
(3:00)
:03225
(2:95)
** Signicant at 5%
t-stats between parenthesis
1wages in thousands of dollars
2in thousands of workers
Dummies for sector and year included
Second Step: Bootstrapped Errors
NB Poisson
Health Insurance  2:0323
( 1:92)
 2:333
( 2:18)
Health  :0806
( 12:90)
 :07920
( 13:38)
Age :00991
(1:38)
:00951
(1:21)
Union :78571
(3:63)
:73123
(3:16)
Family Size  :03787
( 1:24)
 :03306
( 0:93)
Pay Leave :08684
(0:64)
:30911
(2:08)
Obese :01792
(0:18)
 :20993
( 1:68)
Smoke :1309
(0:94)
 :1388
(0:386)
Firm Size1 1:0761
(2:38)
1:4665
(3:37)
Residuals 2:3028
(2:12)
2:4774
(2:28)
** Signicant at 5%, * Signicant at 10%
t-stats between parenthesis
1in thousands of workers
Dummies for sector and year included
% Change in E (Workdays Missed)
NB Poisson
Health Insurance  86:9%
( 1:92)
 90:3%
( 2:18)
Health  7:7%
( 12:90)
 7:61%
( 13:38)
Age 1:0%
(1:38)
:96%
(1:21)
Union 119:4%
(3:63)
107:8%
(3:16)
Family Size  3:7%
( 1:24)
 3:3%
( 0:93)
Pay Leave 9:1%
(0:64)
36:2%
(2:08)
Obese 1:8%
(0:18)
18:9%
( 1:68)
Smoke 14:0%
(0:94)
 13:0%
(0:386)
Firm Size1 193:3%
(2:38)
333:4%
(3:37)
Residuals 900:2%
(2:12)
1091%
(2:28)
** Signicant at 5%, * Signicant at 10%
t-stats between parenthesis
1in thousands of workers
Dummies for sector and year included
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Table 3 E¤ects of health insurance on productivity (Probit)
First step regression: Probit
Health South Midwest West Hispanic
Held insurance :00273
( 1:00)
 :1448
( 2:17)
:03777
(0:51)
 :1436
( 2:04)
 :6264
( 12:28)
Real Wage1 Firm Size2 Union Smoke Black
:0135
(16:87)
2:0514
(15:02)
:8452
(10:11)
 : 2606
( 5:87)
 :2815
( 4:66)
Age Education Family Size White Collar
:0201
(10:13)
:0707
(9:07)
:0403
(3:27)
:2441
(4:29)
** Signicant at 5%, * Signicant at 10%
t-stats between parenthesis
1wages in thousands of dollars
2in thousands of workers
Dummies for sector and year included
Second Step: Bootstrapped Errors
NB Poisson
Health Insurance  :7364
( 2:16)
 1:0058
( 2:39)
Health  :08078
( 12:9)
 :07804
( 13:52)
Age :00411
(0:81)
:00279
(0:52)
Union :1514
(4:00)
:50298
(3:23)
Family Size  :04411
( 1:41)
 :04504
( 1:37)
Pay Leave :11063
(0:82)
:3326
(2:16)
Obese :03726
(0:38)
 :1860
( 1:51)
Smoke :2100
(1:77)
 :0429
( :32)
Firm Size1 :5293
(2:04)
:9628
(3:01)
Residuals :62630
(3:33)
:7008
(3:01)
** Signicant at 5%, * Signicant at 10%
t-stats between parenthesis
1in thousands of workers
Dummies for sector and year included
% Change in E (Workdays Missed)
NB Poisson
Health Insurance  52:1%
( 2:16)
 63:4%
( 2:39)
Health  7:8%
( 12:9)
 7:5%
( 13:52)
Age 0:4%
(0:81)
0:3%
(0:52)
Union 83:2%
(4:00)
65:4%
(3:23)
Family Size  4:3%
( 1:41)
 4:4%
(1:37)
Pay Leave 11:7%
(0:82)
39:5%
(2:16)
Obese 3:8%
(0:38)
 17:0%
( 1:51)
Smoke 23:4%
(1:77)
 4:2%
( :32)
Firm Size1 69:77%
(2:04)
 161:9%
(3:01)
Residuals 87:1%
(3:33)
101:5%
(3:01)
** Signicant at 5%, * Signicant at 10%
t-stats between parenthesis
1in thousands of workers
Dummies for sector and year included
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9 Appendix A
In this appendix, we look at VL (w) = max fVL (w; y) ;VH (w)g : A rm would
only pay the cost C if the worker opts to buy insurance. Therefore, we can
continue with VL (w; y) and VH (w) and at the end check that for any wage
w4 o¤ered by a company that pays C, VL
 
w4; y
  VH  w4 :Given this,
assuming that the value functions are increasing in w (which we are going
to check later), we may have a cut o¤ (that could be below zero) ew; such
that for w > ew, VL (w; y) > VH (w) (this is only true if we have a single
crossing condition - i.e., we will need log concavity. We can show by obtaining
dVL(w;y)
dw
> dVH(w)
dw
). So, rst of all, lets look at the conditions for the cut o¤.
First of all, lets obtain dVH(w)
dw
. Manipulating the integrals and using the
result that, by denition VL
 
RLH (w) ; y

= VH (w), we have that:
dVH (w)
dw
=
h
1 + H
r+H+S
i
r +  + H(r+S)
r+H+S
+ 1 [1  F (RLH (w))]
where F () is dened as follows:
F (z) = HFH
 
RHL (z)

+ (1  H)FL (z)
Notice that if w > ew, we must have RHL (w) > w and RLH (w) < w :
VH
 
RHL (w)

= VL (w)
and
VH (w) = VL
 
RLH (w)

Therefore, if RHL (w) > w; for monotonicity of the value functions, we must
have RLH (w) < w: This implies that:
1

1  F  RLH (w) > 1 [1  F (w)] , for any w > ew
Now, looking at the derivative for VL (w; y), we obtain:
dVL (w; y)
dw
=

1 + L
r+L+S

r +  + L(r+S)
r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F (w))
We already know that the last term in the denominator is smaller for dVL(w;y)
dw
:
Now, notice that H
r+H+S
> L
r+L+S
, to consider the impact of the increase
34
in this value, lets assume that x = 
r++S
and to simplify consider the last
term in the denominator equals to 1 (1  F ( ew)) (this actually helps dVH(w)dw ).
Then, we have that:
d

1+x
r++(r+S)x+1(1 F ( ew))

dx
=
 (r +  + 1 (1  F ( ew)))  (r + S)
(r +  + (r + S)x+ 1 (1  F ( ew)))2
and this is negative if:
 (r + )  (r + S) < 0)  < (r + S)
(r +  + 1 (1  F ( ew)))
Since we assume that   r+S
r++1
this is always satised and we have the
single-crossing property that we need.
Therefore, whenever S > ; for any w > ew; dVL(w;y)dw > dVH(w)dw : Since
VL ( ew; y) = VH ( ew) ) VL (w) = VL (w; y), for w > ew: This also implies that
for w > ew, RHL (w) > w, as we show in the Lemma B.1.
Now, lets nd an implicit expression for ew. From VL ( ew; y) = VH ( ew) ; we
obtain:
ce = L (DL ( ew)  VL ( ew; y))  H (DH ( ew)  VH ( ew))
Since:
H (DH (e!)  VH (e!)) = H
r + S + H
fe!   H   (r + S)VH (e!) + SD0g
and
L (DL (e!)  VL (e!; y)) = L
r + S + L
fe!   ce   L   (r + S)VL (e!; y) + SD0g
Substituting the terms inside parenthesis, we have:
1 +
L
r + S + L

ce =
( 
L
r+S+L
  Hr+S+H

[e!   (r + S)VH (e!) + SD0]
+ Hr+S+H
H   Lr+S+LL
)
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10 Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. At the reservation wage y of a move from a solid rm with wage x to a
risky rm (i.e. we suppose that y = RHL (x)), and the reservation wage R
L
H(y)
of the reverse transition, it must be the case that
VL(x) = VH(R
H
L (x)) = VH(y) = VL(R
L
H(y)):
But then it follows that RLH(y) = x. Similarly, it follows if R
L
H(y) = x, then
RHL (x) = y. By the strict monotonicity of the value functions the mapping
Rji (y) = x is unique. It is straightforward to see that the resulting function
must be continuous and increasing, if the value functions are increasing and
continuous.
Lemma B.1 ! (w) > w:
Proof. From the previous result, we obtain through manipulations that:
from VH
 
RHL (w)

= VL (w), we obtain:
! (w) =
1h
1 + H
r+S+H
i
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
h
1 + L
r+S+L
i
w   ce
h
1 + L
r+S+L
i
+

L
r+S+L
  H
r+S+H
" + Sb
r+H
+ SH
r+H
V0
  (r + S)VL (w; y)
#
+
"
H
r+H
  S
r+H
L
r+S+L
#
H   Lr+S+LL
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
Rearranging the expression obtained for ! (w), we have:
! (w) = w +

H
r+S+H
  L
r+S+L

h
1 + H
r+S+H
i  e!   !
+(r + S) (VL (w; y)  VH (e!))

Rearranging the expressions for VL (w; y) and VH ( ew), we obtain:
VL (w; y)  VH ( ew) = 1 + L
r + L + S
Z w
ew
1
r +  + L(r+S)r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F (z))
dz
>

1 +
L
r + L + S
Z w
ew
1
r +  + L(r+S)r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F ( ew))dz
=

1 + Lr+L+S

r +  + L(r+S)r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F ( ew)) (w   ew)
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Therefore, we have:
! (w) > w+

H
r+H+S
  Lr+L+S

h
1 + Hr+H+S
i
8<:
24 (r + S)

1 + Lr+L+S

r +  + L(r+S)r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F ( ew))   
35 (w   ew)
9=;
Therefore, if:
(r + S)

1 + L
r+L+S

r +  + L(r+S)
r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F ( ew)) > 
the second term in the RHS is positive. Rearranging the above inequality, we
have:
 <
(r + S)
r +  + 1 (1  F ( ew))
which is satised by ; once   r+S
r++1
.
Lemma B.2 8w > ew; d!(w)
dw
> 1:
Proof.
! (w) = w +

H
r+H+S
  L
r+L+S

h
1 + H
r+H+S
i   ew   w
+(r + S) (VL (w; y)  VH ( ew))

VL (w; y) VH ( ew) = 1 + L
r + L + S
Z w
ew
1
r +  + L(r+S)
r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F (z))
dz
Taking the integral, we have:
d (VL (w; y)  VH ( ew))
dw
=

1 + L
r+L+S

r +  + L(r+S)
r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F (w))
Then:
d! (w)
dw
= 1+

H
r+H+S
  Lr+L+S

h
1 + Hr+H+S
i
8<:
0@ (r + S)

1 + Lr+L+S

r +  + L(r+S)r+S+L
+ 1 (1  F (w))
  
1A9=;
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The second term is positive if:
 <
(r + S)
r +  + 1 (1  F (w))
Since the RHS of the inequality above is decreasing in w, we have that it is
satised for any w > ew if:
 <
(r + S)
r +  + 1 (1  F ( ew))
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. Suppose that a rm that pays the up-front C and o¤ers a wage lower
than ew. As we saw, the worker will not di¤erentiate it from a rm that does
not pay the up-front cost, therefore ! (w) = w. Therefore, at the end the
number of workers this rm keeps in steady state lH (w). Therefore:
ProtL (w) = [p  w (1 + t)] lH (w) w (1 + t) dH (w) C = ProtH (w) C; 8w < ew
Therefore, this rm would have a protable deviation, which would be not
pay the up-front cost C and become a H rm.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. Suppose there exists wB; wA; such that wB > wA, and wB is o¤ered
by a risky rm while wA by a low-risk rm. Then it must be that
p 

1 +
H
H + S

! (wB) (1 + t)

lH (wB)


p 

1 +
H
H + S

! (wA) (1 + t)

lH (wA) (5)
Now, note that:
lL (w)
lH (w)
=
 + 1 (1  F (w)) + SHH+S
 + 1 (1  F (w)) + SLL+S
> 1
Since H > L and L > H :
By taking derivatives, we have:
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d

lL(w)
lH(w)

dw
=
1F
0 (w) S
h
H
H+S
  L
L+S
i
n
 + 1 (1  F (w)) + SLL+S
o2 > 0
Therefore, this ratio is larger than 1 and increasing, In particular, it follows
that:
lL(wB)
lL(wA)
>
lH(wB)
lH(wA)
: (6)
To study the instantaneous prot per worker, notice:
d

p 

1+
L
L+S

w(1+t)
p 

1+
H
H+S

!(w)(1+t)

dw
=
8<:  

1 + LL+S

(1 + t)

p 

1 + HH+S

! (w) (1 + t)

+

1 + HH+S

(1 + t) d!
(w)
dw
h
p 

1 + LL+S

w (1 + t)
i 9=;n
p 

1 + HH+S

! (w) (1 + t)
o2
Now, for any w > ew; d!(w)
dw
> 1, which implies that:
d

p 

1+
L
L+S

w(1+t)
p 

1+
H
H+S

!(w)(1+t)

dw
>
8<:  

1 + LL+S

(1 + t)

p 

1 + HH+S

! (w) (1 + t)

+

1 + HH+S

(1 + t)
h
p 

1 + LL+S

w (1 + t)
i 9=;n
p 

1 + HH+S

! (w) (1 + t)
o2
=
8<:
h
1 + HH+S

 

1 + LL+S
i
(1 + t) p
+

1 + HH+S

1 + LL+S

(1 + t) [! (w)  w]
9=;n
p 

1 + HH+S

! (w) (1 + t)
o2 > 0
since by Lemma 3, no rm that o¤ers health insurance would o¤er a wage
lower than ew; there is no loss of generality.
Therefore:
d

p 

1+
L
L+S

w(1+t)
p 

1+
H
H+S

!(w)(1+t)

dw
> 0
But this means that:
p 

1 + L
L+S

wB (1 + t)
p 

1 + L
L+S

wA (1 + t)
>
p 

1 + H
H+S

! (wB) (1 + t)
p 

1 + H
H+S

! (wA) (1 + t)
: (7)
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Now, putting (6) and (7) together, it follows that (5) implies
p 

1 +
L
L + S

wB (1 + t)

lL (wB)  C


p 

1 +
L
L + S

wA (1 + t)

lL (wA)  C;
which contradicts that wA was the prot maximizing choice of the solid rm.
The connectedness follows from the fact that any holeswill give an oppor-
tunity for a protable deviation by the next (higher) rm, it can increase in-
stantaneous prot per worker, without losing workers faster, or gaining slower.
For details in this argument, please see Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
Corollary B.1 The minimum wage posted by a rm that do not o¤er health
insurance is RHU , while the minimum wage posted by a rm that o¤ers
health insurance is ew:
Corollary B.2 There is no mass point in the distribution of o¤ered wages.
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11 Appendix C
Using the stationary o¤er distributions FL(wL); FH(wH), and the optimal deci-
sions of workers, we can derive the stationary distribution of workers of wages.
Employing that all equivalent-wages o¤ered by solid rms are higher, we can
derive the stationary risky rm distribution. First, looking at the more general
case to, to use derivatives to nd the change in the wage distribution GL over
time:
dGL (w; t)
dt
= 0 (1  H)FL (w; t)u (t) + 1 (1  H)FL (w; t) H (m  u  se   su)
+
8<: +LSL (w; t) (1  sH) se   1 (1  H) (1  FL (w; t))
+ + L

GL (w; t) (1  H) (m  se   su   u)
9=;
in steady state:
GL (w) =

[0u+ 1H (m  u  se   su)] (1  H)FL (w)
+LSL (w) (1  sH) se


1 (1  H) (1  FL (w))
+ + L

(1  H) (m  se   su   u)
while the proportion of sick employees at health-coverage rms working at
wage  w
dSL (w; t)
dt
= LGL (w; t) (1  H) (m  se   su   u) (S + L)SL (w; t) (1  sH) se
in steady state:
SL (w) =
LGL (w) (1  H) (m  se   su   u)
(S + L) (1  sH) se
Similarly:
dGH (w; t)
dt
= 0HFH (w; t)u (t) + HSH (w; t) sHse
 

1H (1  FH (w; t))
+1 (1  H) +  + H

GH (w; t) H (m  se   su   u)
Since in steady state dGH(w;t)
dt
= 0, we have:
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GH (w) =
0HFH (w)u+ HSH (w) sHse
1H (1  FH (w))
+1 (1  H) +  + H

H (m  se   su   u)
while:
dSH (w; t)
dt
= HGH (w; t) H (m  se   su   u)  (S + H)SH (w; t) sHse
in steady-state, we have:
SH (w) =
HGH (w) H (m  se   su   u)
(S + H) sHse
To obtain FL (), we use the prot equality condition for all wages o¤ered
by companies that supply health insurance:

p 

1 +
L
L + S

wL0 (1 + t)

0u+ 1G
 
wL0

(m  u  se   su)
 + 1 (1  F (wL0 )) + Si+S L
  C
=

p 

1 +
L
L + S

wL (1 + t)

0u+ 1G (wL) (m  u  se   su)
 + 1 (1  F (wL)) + Si+S L
  C
where F (z) = HFH (!
 (z))+(1  H)FL (z) andG (z) = HGH (! (z))+
(1  H)GL (z) : Then, since wL0 is the minimum wage o¤ered by a company
with health insurance and therefore it must be the highest wage o¤ered by a
company that does not o¤er health insurance from Theorem 1, we have that
F
 
wL0

= H : Similarly, G
 
wL0

= H . Therefore,introducing this values and
the expression obtained previously to G (), we obtain:
FL (w) =
h
 + 1 (1  H) + SL+S L
i
1 (1  H)
8><>:1 
0@p 

1 + L
L+S

wL (1 + t)
p 

1 + L
L+S

wL0 (1 + t)
1A
1
2
9>=>;
Using this expression we can obtain GL (w) and SL (w).
Now lets look at FH (). From previous results, we know that the minimum
wage o¤ered by a rm not o¤ering health insurance is RHU . Then, we have that:
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
p 

1 +
H
H + S

RLU (1 + t)

0u
 + 1 +
S
H+S
H
=

p 

1 +
H
H + S

! (wH) (1 + t)

0u+ 1HGH (!
 (wH)) (m  u  se   su)
 + 1 (1  HFH (! (wH))) + SH+S H
Substituting G () and rearranging, we have:
FH (!
 (wH)) =
h
 + 1 +
S
H+S
H
i
1H
8><>:1 
0@p 

1 + H
H+S

! (wH) (1 + t)
p 

1 + H
H+S

RLU (1 + t)
1A
1
2
9>=>;
with few manipulations, we have:
FH (wH) =
h
 + 1 +
S
H+S
H
i
1H
8><>:1 
0@p 

1 + H
H+S

wH (1 + t)
p 

1 + H
H+S

RHU (1 + t)
1A
1
2
9>=>;
Using the wage distributions obtained above, we are able to fully char-
acterize the wage o¤ered in equilibrium. From Theorem 1 we know that in
equivalent-wage terms, no health-coverage rms pay lower wages than rms
that o¤er health coverage. This means that the very lowest nominal wages
(RHU ) are always o¤ered by the risky rms.
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In this case, to fully characterize the wages o¤ered in equilibrium we need
to nd the reservation wage, RHU ; and the maximum wage paid by rm which
does not provide health insurance, wH :With these information we are able to
determine the high risk rmso¤ered wage range, [R0; wH ]; and the low risk
rmswage range, [wL0 ; wL]:
First lets nd the highest wage o¤ered by a rm which doesnt o¤er health
insurance (to nd it, put FH(wH) = 1, and solve,
wH =
1
1 + H
H+S

(1 + t)
8><>:p 
264

+1(1 H)+ SH+S H
+1+
S
H+S
H
2



p 

1 + H
H+S

RHU (1 + t)

375
9>=>; ;
Note that the value of wH depends crucially on L: Indeed, as H ! 0,
wH ! R0: Since the dispersion of wages o¤ered by risky companies on the
25Provided there is a positive mass of risky rms.
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interval [R0; wH ] are generated by the competition between no health-coverage
companies, as the measure of no health-coverage companies reduces, this dis-
persion shrink to 0:
Similarly, we can derive the maximum wage paid by a solid company,
w =
1
1 + L
L+S

(1 + t)
8><>: p 

+
SL
L+S
+1(1 H)+ SLL+S
2



p 

1 + L
L+S

wL0 (1 + t)

9>=>;
Again, as H ! 1, we have that wL ! wL0 :
To obtain wL0 , we need to no compare the minimum wage asked by em-
ployees to accept health coverage once o¤ered, ew and the optimal wage wL0
obtained calculating: !
 
wL0

= wH ; since once the constraint ew is not bind-
ing, we can easily show that the wage set must be connected: Then:
wL0 = max

wL0 ; ew	
Finally, we can obtain an expression for RHU , as we substitute the results
obtained previously.
To close the model, we use the prot equality condition to pin down H .
We can show that the equilibrium is unique.
! u : unemployed healthy:
inow:  (m  u  se   su) + Hsu;
outow: Hu+ 0u
Rearranging:
u =
 (m  se   su) + Hsu
H + 0 + 
! su : sick out of job workers:
inow: Sse + Hu;
outow: Hsu
Rearranging:
su =
Sse + Hu
H
Substituting it back in the expression for u :
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u =
m+

S   

1 + S
H

se
0 +  +
H
H
! se : sick and employed workers:
inow: H (m  u  se   su)H + (1  H) (m  se   su   u)L;
outow: sHseH + (1  sH) seL + Sse
Rearranging:
se =
(HH + (1  H)L) (m  u  su)
sHH + (1  sH) L+
+S + HH + (1  H)L

Now, equations to obtain the proportions : H ; sH :
! H :
inow: 0Hu+ HsHse;
outow:

H (m  se   su   u) + HH (m  se   su   u)
+1 (1  H) H (m  se   su   u)

Rearranging:
H =
0Hu+ HsHse
[ + H + 1 (1  H)] (m  se   su   u)
! sH :
inow: HH (m  se   su   u) ;
outow: SsHse + HsHse:
sH =
HH (m  u  se   su)
(S + H) se
Now, we are going to solve this system with 5 equations and 5 unknowns
(H ; se; sH ; u; su). Rearranging the above expressions, we have:8>>>>><>>>>>:
(m  u  se   su) = (S+H)sesHHH (sH)
(m  u  se   su) = [sHH+(1 sH)L+S ]seHH+(1 H)L (se)
(m  u  se   su) = 0Hu+HsHse[+H+1(1 H)]H (H)
 (m  u  se   su) + Hsu = Hu+ 0u (u)
Sse + Hu = Hsu (su)
Then, substituting (su) into (u), we have:
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8>>><>>>:
(m  u  se   su) = (S+H)sesHHH (sH)
(m  u  se   su) = [sHH+(1 sH)L+S ]seHH+(1 H)L (se)
(m  u  se   su) = 0Hu+HsHse[+H+1(1 H)]H (H)
 (m  u  se   su) + Sse = 0u (u)
Then multiplying (u) by H and substituting into (H), we have:8><>:
(m  u  se   su) = (S+H)sesHHH (sH)
(m  u  se   su) = [sHH+(1 sH)L+S ]seHH+(1 H)L (se)
(m  u  se   su) = (SH+HsH)se[(+H+1(1 H))H H ] (H)
Then, equalizing (sH) and (se), we obtain:
(S + H) sH
HH
=
[sHH + (1  sH) L + S]
HH + (1  H)L
sH =
HH (L + S)
HH (L + S) + (1  H)L (H + S)
Similarly, equalizing (sH) and (H), we have:
(S + H) sH
HH
=
(SH + HsH)
[( + H + 1 (1  H)) H   H ]
sH =
HHSH
f[( + H + 1 (1  H)) H   H ] (S + H)  HHHg
Then, we have:
(L + S) f[( + H + 1 (1  H)) H   H ] (S + H)  HHHg
= SH f(HH + (1  H)L) (S + H) + (L   H)HHg
From this expression we can obtain H : Rearranging it, we have:
H =
(S + H) f (S + L) + SLg
(S + H)LSH + (S + H) (S + L) ( + 1 (1  H)) + LSH (1  H)
Substituting this into sH , we have:
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sH =
H (S + H) (S + L) H f (S + L) + SLg
H (S + H) (S + L) H [ (S + L) + SL]
+L (1  H) (S + L) [(S + H) (S + L) ( + 1) + LSH ]

Few more calculations, we obtain:
se =
0H (HH + (1  H)L)m
[S + sHH + (1  sH) L] (0H +  (H + H))
+ [HH + (1  H)L] (0 (H + S) + (H + H) S)

Substituting sH and H , we have:
se =
0H

(S+H)f(S+L)+SLg
(S+H)LSH+(S+H)(S+L)(+1(1 H))+LSH(1 H) (H   L) + L

m8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
26666666666664
S+
H(S+H)(S+L)Hf(S+L)+SLg8>>>>><>>>>>:
H (S + H) (S + L) 
H

 (S + L)
+SL

+L (1  H) (S + L)
24 (S + H)  (S + L)
 ( + 1) + LSH
35
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(H   L)
+L
37777777777775


0H
+ (H + H)

+

H (H   L)
+L

0 (H + S)
+ (H + H) S

9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
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